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Chapter 12
Collective Pensions and the Global Financial
Crisis: The Case of the Netherlands
Lans Bovenberg and Theo Nijman
The financial crisis has had a major impact on Dutch occupational pension
schemes. The direct effect was that funding rates dropped dramatically,
and indirectly the crisis revealed some weaknesses of the system and there-
fore led to various proposals for reforms. This chapter explores the impact
of the crisis on the Dutch pension system and discusses various reform
proposals.
In what follows, we first describe the Dutch pension system, followed by a
discussion of the major strengths of the system compared to mainstream
defined contribution (DC) schemes. The Dutch pension system is a rather
unique pension system in the sense that it contains a large funded occupa-
tion pillar with forced participation and annuitization. Next, we investigate
the impact of the financial crisis on the thinking about Dutch occupational
pensions. We then turn to the main proposals for reform and discuss three
kinds of pension rights that play a role in the current discussion. We discuss
alternative pension reforms that have been proposed and end with
conclusions.
Dutch occupational pensions
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The first pillar is a pay-
as-you-go public pension scheme. It provides a basic flat pension to all
older residents at a level that is related to the minimum wage. Compared to
other European Union (EU) countries, the state pension in the Nether-
lands provides only a relatively small part of pension income for those
workers earning middle and higher incomes. If these workers want to
maintain their standard of living in retirement, they need additional pen-
sion income. This is where the second pillar of occupational pensions
comes in. The third pillar consists of voluntary personal savings, which
are tax-favored up to a ceiling. This pillar can be used to tailor the pension
portfolio to individual preferences and characteristics, and is especially
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important for self-employed individuals who lack occupation pension
provisions.
Occupational pension schemes
Occupational pension schemes in the second pillar are funded. These
schemes are earnings-related and supplement the flat public benefit for
workers who earn more than the minimum wage. These schemes cover
more than 90 percent of the labor force. The pension scheme is part of the
labor contract, which is typically negotiated between unions and employers
in collective labor agreements. Employees are thus obliged to participate in
the negotiated pension scheme.
Dutch pension funds are independent trusts with their own governance
and administrative structures. The governing board of pension funds con-
sists of equal representatives of employers and unions. The value of assets
in the second pillar amounts to about 800 billion euro (125 percent of
GDP). Industry-wide pension funds are organized for workers in a specific
sector of the economy. These sectoral funds own more than two-thirds of
the assets in the second pillar and account for more than 80 percent of the
active participants. A company can opt out of an industry fund only if it
offers a better pension plan than the plan offered by the sectoral fund.1
This mandatory participation of firms in sectoral arrangements explains
the high coverage of supplementary pensions in the Netherlands.
Guarantees and ambitions
The occupational plans are run like defined benefit (DB) plans, which aim
at a certain annuity level during retirement. Years of service and a reference
wage typically determine the benefit entitlement. The reference wage used
to be the final wage but in the past decade most funds have moved to
career-average schemes. In these schemes, entitlements to deferred annu-
ities accrue based on a percentage of the average wage level during the
career. These schemes typically aim at an annuity level of about 80 percent
of average pay (including the flat public benefit) after forty years of service.
This corresponds to an accrual rate of about 2 percent per year. The goal is
to index the deferred annuity to wage inflation during the accumulation
phase. During the payout phase, some funds aim to index annuities to
price inflation but others aspire to a link with the development of contrac-
tual wages.
The aspired annuity levels are ambitions rather than guarantees. In
particular, the pension funds aim to index the pension rights to prices
or wages, but this indexation is not guaranteed because indexation is
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conditional on the financial performance of the fund. One can in fact view
the system as a hybrid system of guarantees and ambitions; nominal an-
nuities are in principle guaranteed (but see below), but the degree to
which pensions rise in line with prices and wages depends on the perfor-
mance of the investments of the pension funds.
Through the shift from final-pay to career-average schemes with condi-
tional indexation of nominal pension rights, pension funds have made
indexation of the pension rights of workers conditional on the financial
performance of the pension fund. Conditional indexation in these career-
average schemes applies not only to the pension rights of the already retired
members who are in the decumulation stage but also to the indexation of
the pension rights of workers who are still in the accumulation stage. These
reforms have thus strengthened the impact of the indexation instrument on
the funding rate because this instrument now affects all accrued liabilities of
the fund (including the entitlements of workers to deferred annuities). As a
result of these reforms, those in the active working population absorb more
risks in terms of their pension rights. Moreover, participants rather than
employers have become the main risk-bearers of the fund.
More complete contracts
Several large sectoral pension funds now employ policy ladders—rules that
state explicitly how both the extent of indexation of pension rights and a
possible recovery premium (levied on top of the cost-based premia for the
newly accumulated pension benefits) vary with the funding ratio. These
policy ladders can be viewed as more complete contracts compared to the
previous rather incomplete ones, which allowed for a great deal of discre-
tion by the governing board. Indeed, in the past, funds would make only
rather ambiguous statements that pension rights would be indexed as long
as the financial position of the fund would allow it.
A policy ladder for a typical Dutch pension fund is shown in Figure 12.1,
which is adapted from Ponds and van Riel (2009). The horizontal axis
measures the assets of the pension fund. The nominal liabilities LN corres-
ponds to the value of nominal annuities, while LR measures the value of
indexed annuities. The values of these nominal and real annuities are
calculated by using the nominal and real yield curve, respectively. The
nominal curve is derived from prices of Government Bonds and published
by the supervisor. The real curve can be derived from the nominal one
using observed breakeven inflations in the (small) OTC (over-the-counter)
market for inflation products.
The left vertical axis measures the actual extent of indexation of the
pension rights. This actual indexation depends on comparing the actual
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indexation reserve A –LN to the indexation reserve that is required to fully
meet the ambition to index the pension rights, LR  LN. If the actual
indexation reserve is positive but less than the reserve needed to fully
meet the aspirations (i.e. LN < A < LE so that the nominal funding rate
A/LN exceeds 100 percent but the real funding rate A/LR is lower than 100
percent), then actual indexation is provided in proportion to the actual
indexation reserve A–LN as a share of the required indexation reserve
LR –LN. If the actual indexation reserve exceeds the required reserve, then
the pension fund provides the so-called catch-up indexation to make up for
missed indexation in the past. The dotted line in Figure 12.1 depicts this
possibility.
The collective buffer A–LN serves not only as an indexation reserve but
also as a solvency buffer for the nominal annuities (i.e. the hard obligations
of the fund). Solvency regulations stipulate that the solvency buffer should
be so large that a year from now the nominal funding rate continues to
exceed 100 percent in 97.5 percent of the cases. If this is not the case, the
pension fund has a reserve shortage and should hand in a recovery plan to
the supervisor. This plan should show how the fund will build up the
required reserve on the expected path within fifteen years. For most
pension funds, the critical level of the nominal funding rate below which
they suffer from a reserve shortage is around 125 percent. If the nominal
funding rate is below 105 percent, the fund is underfunded. If it features
Contribution rate
Catch-up
indexation
Indexation rate
Full
indexation
Base
contribution
rate
0%
LN LR A
Figure 12.1 Conditional indexation and contribution mechanisms in the Dutch
pension system
Source : Ponds and van Riel (2009).
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such a funding shortage, the fund must make a recovery plan that shows
that the nominal funding rate will exceed 105 percent on the expected
path in three years.
The left vertical axis of Figure 12.1 also measures the contribution rate.
The base contribution rate is calculated as the market value of the hybrid
pension claims that are acquired by the active participants (i.e. a nominal
DB guarantee and a risky DC claim). An additional so-called recovery
premium may be charged if the fund exhibits a funding shortage or a
reserve shortage.
Strengths of Dutch occupation plans
This section discusses the main strengths of Dutch occupation pension
schemes compared to mainstream DC schemes.
Advanced risk management
The Dutch occupational pension plans aim at achieving the ambition of a
DB promise of an appropriate income level during retirement. In partic-
ular, the pension fund manages interest-rate risks and inflation risks so as
to guarantee the nominal annuities and to realize its ambition to index
these annuities to inflation. Hence, the hedge portfolio is defined in
terms of income streams during retirement. Indeed, the main risks (e.g.
investment risk, inflation risk, interest-rate risk, and longevity risk) are
managed so as to hedge risks on behalf of households while at the same
time exploiting the risk premia on various risk factors by optimizing the
trade-off between return and risk (in terms of mismatch with portfolio
hedging income risks).
Protection against behavioral biases
Cooperative pension plans allow individuals with scarce cognitive abil-
ities to delegate complex saving, investment, and insurance decisions
to professionals. Collective pension funds assist individuals in properly
exploiting their long-run investment horizon and in gaining access to
complex investment strategies provided by modern financial markets.
More sophisticated life cycle investment by pension funds on behalf
of long-term investors stabilizes financial markets and facilitates macro-
economic stability.
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Low expenses, substantial buying power,
and reduced selection
Cooperative pension funds with compulsory participation of members
reduce marketing and other transaction costs. The board of trustees can
contract out various financial services to insurance companies, hedge
funds, or mutual funds. Accordingly, competition occurs on a wholesale
level rather than a retail level. This tends to reduce transaction costs for
individual members, who typically lack sufficient expertise to buy the
various services that make up the pension product. Moreover, joining
forces in a cooperative pension fund that is run professionally strengthens
the buying power of individuals, exploits scale economies in buying com-
plex financial products that are not available to individual investors, and
helps to discipline commercial financial service providers to act in the
interests of the members of the pension fund. Another advantage of forced
risk pooling in a sectoral pension fund is that it reduces selection in
longevity insurance. Also, this helps to reduce the costs of pension
insurance.
Completion of financial markets and intergenerational
risk sharing
Collective risk pooling not only combats selection in longevity insurance
but also allows members to exchange risks that are not (yet) traded in
financial markets. In particular, youngmembers can share in longevity risks
faced by older cohorts. To illustrate, if these cohorts live longer than
expected, the resulting lower funding rate affects the indexation quality
of the deferred annuities of the younger cohorts. In this way, the pension
schemes help to fill the gaps of incomplete financial markets. Moreover,
by linking pension benefits to the wages of workers, pension funds allow
retirees to share in the wage risks of workers. Furthermore, young workers
can share in financial market risks faced by the older members through
the so-called recovery contributions. In fact, the risky pension contribu-
tions produced by the mismatch risk allow the young to transform their
human capital into an asset with exposure to financial risks (Beetsma and
Bovenberg, 2009).
In principle, one can share financial-market shocks not only between
currently living generations but also with generations that are not yet
participating in the pension scheme when the shocks actually materialize.
In fact, the pension fund buys risk-bearing assets on behalf of future
generations by, in effect, borrowing from older generations. From an ex
ante point of view, this internal trade is actually welfare-improving because
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financial shocks are shared even more broadly, namely not only with the
currently participating generations but also with future generations (Teul-
ings and de Vries, 2006).
The impact of the crisis
Figure 12.2 displays the development of the nominal funding rates of
Dutch pension funds in the past few years.2 Before the onset of the finan-
cial crisis in 2007, the average nominal funding rate amounted to about 145
percent. A buffer of 45 percent of liabilities looks robust at first sight.
However, a nominal funding rate of 145 percent translates into a real
funding rate of close to 100 percent.3 Moreover, funding rates differed
across funds. About 35 percent of the pension funds exhibited a funding
rate below 130 percent, close to the level below which funds feature a
reserve shortage.4
The crisis caused the average funding ratio to decrease substantially from
145 percent before the crisis to a trough of about 90 percent in the first
quarter of 2009.5 In view of the underfunding, most pension funds have
handed in a recovery plan in the beginning of 2009. Currently, the average
funding rate is about 105 percent—the critical level for a funding shortage.
Three main factors contributed to the fall of funding rates since 2007.
First of all, the worldwide collapse of share prices played a major role in the
immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. Second, a sharp decline in
50
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Figure 12.2 Average nominal funding rate of Dutch pension funds: 1988 – 2010
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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nominal interest rates increased the present value of nominal pension
liabilities. The rise in liabilities was not insufficiently compensated by the
increase in the value of bonds (or interest derivatives) on the asset side of
the balance sheet because assets did not match nominal liabilities: not only
were bond holdings (and derivatives hedging nominal interest-rate risk)
much smaller than nominal pension liabilities, but also the duration of the
bonds owned by pension funds was typically substantially shorter than that
of pension liabilities. Most of the decline in the funding rate between 2007
and 2011 can be attributed to the lower nominal interest rates. The final
factor behind the drop in funding rates is lower mortality. Following major
health-care reforms in 2001, mortality rates for retirees have dropped more
substantially than anticipated earlier. Upward revisions of life expectancy
have depressed average funding rates by about 5 percentage points.
The financial crisis has had a major impact on thinking about Dutch
occupational pensions. The main impacts are taken up next.
Participants become more aware that they are risk-bearers
The financial crisis revealed to participants that they have become a major
risk-bearer in the pension system. In part, as a result of the move from a
final-pay to a career-average system, occupation pension systems are no
longer pure DB systems, but have beenmoving in the direction of collective
DC systems in which participants rather than employers are the main risk-
bearers. Indeed, pension funds are relying increasingly on the indexation
instrument and less on the instrument of fluctuating recovery pension
contributions to absorb risk. Table 12.1 shows how actual indexation to
retirees has lagged indexation ambitions in recent years.
The main reason why participants are becoming the main risk-bearer is
that aging and the maturation of pension funds makes recovery contribu-
tions a less effective instrument to maintain the solvency of pension funds.
With a rising ratio of pensioners to workers, pension liabilities are increas-
ing compared to wages, so that large changes in contributions are required
to contain fluctuations in liabilities pension benefits. Indeed, for many
companies, financial and actuarial risks of pension guarantees start to
Table 12.1 Actual increases in nominal pensions paid to retirees, compared to the
indexation ambition: 2005 –11
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Indexation ambition 0.49 0.85 2.33 1.84 3.76 1.66 1.2
Actual indexation 0.3 0.82 2.14 2.91 0.17 0.42 0.02
Source : De Nederlandsche Bank (2010).
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dominate those of the core business for many companies. They therefore
no longer underwrite the risks of their pension funds. Whereas volatile
financial markets and increasing pension liabilities have increased finan-
cial risks of pension funds, employers are thus supplying less risk-bearing
capital to these pension funds. As a direct consequence, participants must
supply more risk-bearing capital through pension rights that fluctuate with
financial shocks.
Another reason why contributions can no longer absorb shocks is that
contribution rates to Dutch occupational pensions have reached rather
high levels (see Figure 12.3). The costs of volatile contributions are increas-
ingly being recognized in terms of adverse demand- and-supply side-effects.
In particular, fluctuating recovery premia are likely to affect the demand
side of the economy in a pro-cyclical fashion. As regards the supply side, the
fluctuating pension contributions distort the labor market. Indeed, higher
pension contributions aimed at correcting funding deficits act as an
implicit tax on labor.
Lack of risk-bearing capital
The financial crisis has also shown that the indexation instrument may not
be strong enough to stabilize funding rates in times of economic stress.
Indeed, the volatility of financial markets is large compared to the steering
capacity of the indexation instrument. The evaluation of the Dutch gov-
ernment of its solvency regulations has revealed that these regulations have
tended to underestimate financial risks (including liquidity risk). Whereas
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Figure 12.3 Average pension contribution rates as percentage of gross wage
income: 1970 – 2008
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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financial risks have increased, risk-bearing capital in pension funds has
declined as a result of high contribution levels and a premium base that
is declining compared to pension liabilities.
Declining mortality rates requires higher retirement age
Mortality rates in the Netherlands have been rather flat in the past two
decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, increases in pension costs due
to lower mortality could easily be financed on account of booming finan-
cial markets, resulting in high funding rates in the 1990s. Since 2002,
however, mortality rates of pensioners have started to drop substantially.
It gradually became clear that this involved a structural development so
that pension funds had to revise their mortality projections downward. In
the face of the financial crisis and the high level of contribution rates, the
associated higher structural pension costs could no longer be financed out
of higher-than-expected returns or increased higher contribution rates.
More and more stakeholders became convinced that longer life expec-
tancy must go together with a higher retirement age. The rule of automati-
cally linking pensions to life expectancy avoids the political costs of
discretionary decisions to limit eligibility to public pensions and tax bene-
fits if longevity increases further. Agreeing on a risk-sharing rule ex ante
also reduces the political risks associated with collective discretionary deci-
sion-making. Moreover, it allows individuals and firms to gradually adapt to
a longer working life by better maintaining human capital and adjusting
the organization of work. An increase in spending on disability pensions
and unemployment benefits is thereby avoided.
By reducing output levels, the financial crisis worsened the public fin-
ances, which were already burdened by rising health-care costs. To restore
the sustainability of the public finances, the Dutch government proposed
to increase the eligibility age for the public pension from 65 to 67. These
proposals also include tightening the tax regime for supplementary pen-
sions so that the retirement age of the occupation pensions rise in line with
the higher retirement age for the public pension.
Ambiguous status of nominal guarantees
The low nominal funding rates caused by the financial crisis have compli-
cated the investment policy of the funds. Do they defend nominal guaran-
tees by matching these nominal obligations and de-risking their investment
strategy? Or do they continue to take investment risk in order to retain
upside potential and to hedge inflation risk so as to protect the prospect
that they will be able to index their nominal obligations to (wage) inflation?
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The current pension contract is rather ambiguous about which invest-
ment policy pension funds should implement at low nominal funding
rates. The supervisory rules do not force pension funds to match their
nominal obligations if capital buffers become very low. These rules thus
leave substantial discretion to the pension funds on how to respond to low
funding rates in terms of their investment policies. In fact, substantial risk-
taking is observed even if nominal funding rates are close to 100 percent.6
In this way, funds take the risk that they eventually will have to cut nominal
pensions. After the nominal funding rate of a pension fund falls below 100
percent, a pension fund has three years to recover to a funding rate above
100 percent. If the fund cannot show recovery on the expected path these
three years, it may have to cut nominal pension rights.
The possibility that nominal benefits could be cut came as an unpleasant
surprise to many pensioners and eroded the confidence of members in
pension funds. Indeed, there is a clear mismatch between what funds
communicate (nominal guarantees) and how they invest. In the face of
the investment policies of the larger pension funds, one can argue that the
current contract does not provide guarantees and is characterized by
benefits that depend on financial returns. In other words, the pension
system has lost its DB nature altogether in the sense that not only index-
ation but also nominal pensions are no longer guaranteed. By reducing
nominal funding rates, the financial crisis revealed a major weakness of the
Dutch pension system, namely the ambiguity of the current pension con-
tract in general and the status of the nominal ‘obligations’ in particular.
Tension between nominal and real thinking:
what is a hedging portfolio?
This ambiguity of nominal guarantees can be explained as follows. On the
one hand, nominal guarantees can be matched much easier by financial
assets than real guarantees because the supply of inflation-linked bonds is
very limited. Moreover, participants tend to suffer from money illusion and
thus value nominal guarantees. On the other hand, defending nominal
guarantees in the face of low nominal funding rates can be quite costly in
terms of the ambition of the funds to safeguard the purchasing power of
pension rights.
Indeed, in the face of fluctuating inflation expectations, funds must
choose between stabilizing nominal or real funding rates (or alternatively,
selecting nominal pension income or a real pension income as the risk-free
asset that needs to be hedged). In particular, investing in short-term
instruments allows funds to take advantage of rising nominal interest
rates if inflation expectations increase so as to stabilize real funding rates
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and protect the purchasing power of pensions. This investment policy,
however, leaves open the risk that falling nominal interest rates worsen
the nominal funding rate further. This tension between meeting nominal
obligations and hedging inflation risks (i.e. thinking in nominal or real
terms) has become especially stark in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
On the one hand, low funding rates and the desire not to cut nominal
pensions encourage funds to protect their nominal funding rate. On the
other hand, uncertainty about inflation is substantial after a financial crisis
so that funds want to hedge inflation risks by investing in short-term bonds.
Ownership of risk and buffers ambiguous
The pension contract is ambiguous in terms of not only investment policy
(and the associated guarantees andmismatch risk) but also the distribution
of mismatch risk. Although pension funds have strived to make risk-sharing
contracts more complete through policy ladders (see Figure 12.1), the
current policy ladders tend to be silent on what happens if the funding
rate (i.e. assets as a percentage of the nominal liabilities) falls below 105
percent. Whereas most pension funds thus continue to take nominal risks
at the low funding rates produced by the financial crisis, it is thus unclear
who the owner of this risk is.
More generally, the ownership of the collective buffers is not transpar-
ent. It is also unclear, for example, what happens if the buffers rise above
the level that is necessary to finance fully indexed pensions. Moreover, the
policy ladders are at present not more than guidelines for the governing
board. They have no legal status and thus do not offer the same protection
as legal property rights do. Indeed, the government boards of the pension
funds still dispose of substantial discretion in redistributing resources
across stakeholders.7 The ambiguous ownership of risks and buffers is
problematic. First of all, if risk ownership is unclear, the fund cannot target
its investment policy at the risk preferences of the owners of the risk.
Second, incomplete and nontransparent pension contracts may give rise
to unpleasant surprises and serious conflicts if shocks hit. To illustrate,
when funds became underfunded after the financial crisis, it was unclear
who owned these deficits and which stakeholders would have to reduce
their claims on the fund or increase resources. Third, the parties who end
up with the risk ex post may not be rewarded properly ex ante. Indeed,
these incomplete contracts may give rise to substantial, nontransparent
value transfers between stakeholders.8 To illustrate, the benefits in the
Dutch occupational pension plans are currently heavily backloaded: the
pension fund charges the same price for a deferred annuity for all age
groups even though the annuities for the young are cheaper. This lack of
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market pricing implicit in the uniform pricing of deferred annuities im-
plies that the young are taxed on their working effort while the old are
subsidized.
Inadequate communication of risks surrounding
real pension income
The ways funds communicate with their participants are still based on the
DB system and have not yet adjusted to the new realities in which partici-
pants are the main risk-bearers. Nontransparent communication is also
related to the nontransparent pension contract (see above). Pension
funds typically communicate in terms of nominal pension rights, but
are rather silent on indexation prospects and the uncertainty about
these expectations. After the transition from final-pay to career-average
systems with conditional indexation, information about nominal pension
rights of workers is inadequate for estimating the expected replacement
rate at retirement.
The financial crisis, which has reduced the indexation potential, has
made better communication of the uncertainty9 surrounding the pur-
chasing power of pensions all the more urgent. Indeed, estimates suggest
that workers can expect a decline of as much as 15 percent in their
replacement rates as a consequence of inadequate indexation (van
Ewijk and Teulings, 2011). As residual risk bearers in pension plans,
members should be informed about the risks they face so that they can
take this into account in their own financial planning. Timely communi-
cation about risks is also essential to maintain the legitimacy of and trust
in the system.
Supervision focuses on nominal rights
The solvency rules in the Dutch risk-based supervisory framework in fact
focus on the unconditional nominal rights rather than on the uncondi-
tional pension rights, which typically involve the ambition of the pension
funds to index pension rights to prices or even wages. Hence, capital
funding does not necessarily extend also to soft pension rights. This implies
that the indexation potential of funds remains outside much of public
regulation, even though this is a major part of the expected pension,
especially of workers with a long duration. In fact, funds are discouraged
from being explicit about their indexation ambitions for fear that this leads
to higher funding requirements. Hence, only nominal obligations are on
the balance sheets of pension funds.
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‘One size fits all’ under discussion
The current Dutch occupational pension plans impose uniform invest-
ment and indexation rules on all participants. This limits the scope to
attune risk exposure to the needs of various cohorts. Efficient risk-sharing
implies that an adverse shock causes consumption of all agents to decline
by the same percentage.10 For younger workers, human wealth is the most
important wealth component. For older members, in contrast, pension
rights account for most of individual wealth. Hence, in order to achieve
the same relative change in overall wealth for all cohorts (as required by
optimal risk-sharing), the pension wealth of young cohorts should fluctu-
ate more than that of older generations if a shock hits the pension funds.
These arguments for life cycle investing have led to proposals to differenti-
ate indexation rules across cohorts (see e.g. Molenaar and Ponds, 2011).
Younger generations can then take more risks on their pension savings and
benefit from the associated risk premiums, whereas the contract for the
elderly is geared primarily toward protection of the purchasing power of
the pension entitlements. This would alleviate the tensions between youn-
ger and older generations about the preferred investment policy. In partic-
ular, in aging pension funds, investment policies may become rather
conservative under the influence of more numerous retirees, thereby
raising pension costs for workers.
With risks increasingly being shifted unto participants, there is also
increased interest in giving individuals a say in how much risk they want
to bear. The social partners also mentioned this as an option in their
pension agreement, which will be referred to in the next section. At the
same time, one is very aware of the extensive literature documenting that
individuals have difficulties in taking adequate financial decisions and that
specification of defaults and nudges is an important task of the trustees of
the fund.
Advisory committees and pension agreement
The process to redesign the Dutch pension contract was kicked off in the
spring of 2010 with the reports of two advisory committees installed by the
Dutch government: the Frijns committee on investments and risk manage-
ment and the Goudswaard committee on sustainability of the supplemen-
tary pension system. Goudswaard et al. (2010) emphasized that the Dutch
pension contract exhibits important design features that are to be valued
and protected: focus on annual income until death (i.e. annuitization)
rather than pension wealth at retirement, mandatory participation, low
cost levels, and risk-sharing of untraded risk factors such as longevity and
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wage risks within a collective pension fund. At the same time, this report
argued that the existing supplementary pension system is not sustainable
due to a gradual erosion of the risk-bearing capacity and the lack of
possibilities to tailor the contract to individual characteristics of the
participants (such as their age or wealth level). Goudswaard et al. (2010)
stressed the trade-off between the cost of a pension contract, the ambition
level (the expected annual income), and the level of certainty. Noting that
the contribution rates for supplementary pensions (which can be as high as
20 percent in the Netherlands) have reached a maximum, the committee
urged the social partners to reduce either the expected annual pension
income or the level of guarantees. The pension agreement by the social
partners in June 2010 has made clear that they prefer to reduce the level of
guarantees and introduce the so-called ‘soft rights’ in which pension
income depends on changes in life expectancy and on returns on financial
markets. These soft rights in effect provide risk-bearing capital to the
pension funds so that they can continue to take investment risk on behalf
of the participants.
Both Frijns et al. (2010)11 and Goudswaard et al. (2010) stressed potential
conflicts of interest between different groups of participants within a collec-
tive pension fund. To illustrate, as many papers advocating life cycle invest-
ing show (cf. Bodie et al., 1992; Viceira, 2001; Cocco et al., 2005; Teulings
and de Vries, 2006), taking substantial investment risk is more attractive for
young participants than for retirees. Similarly, protecting nominal guaran-
tees by reducing equity exposure and hedging interest-rate risks is primarily
in the interest of the elderly. This tension is increased because many pension
funds are ‘aging giants’: more than 60 percent of total pension assets is
earmarked for pensions that have already commenced or will commence
within ten years. This means that the pension funds’ investment horizon is
becoming shorter, thereby reducing their ability to recover from negative
investment results. Major disruptions in financial markets can thus turn
ageing giants into ‘sinking giants’: institutions that are no longer able to
meet their commitments. This worsens the risk–return trade-off so that
pension funds have to invest more conservatively, but this may make the
investment policy unattractive for young workers.
The reports also note that the property rights of the collective buffer in
the current contract are ill-defined. Among other things, this can create
incentives for excessive risk-taking because risks may be shifted to future
generations. Both committees also emphasize that the purchasing power of
the pension income is the relevant information and that communication to
participants should emphasize expected real pension income and risks,
rather than provide information only on nominal income.
In June 2010, the social partners concluded an agreement on pensions.
As regarding the public pension, they agreed that the eligibility age and the
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statutory retirement age for mandatory retirement will be linked to life
expectancy in such a way that the average number of pension years for each
generation would be equal to the average expected pension years for the
generations who started to collect the state pension between 2000 and
2009. On the occupation pensions, social partners agreed that contribu-
tions should not rise further. Hence, cost increases on account of increased
longevity and financial shocks should be avoided. On longevity increases,
the number of pension years for a fixed contribution period should be
stabilized. At the same time, financial shocks should be absorbed in pen-
sion rights to make the system more shock proof. Social partners agreed
that they would explore whether participants could be offered individual
choices on their risk exposure.
In any case, new pension contracts should be transparent and complete.
Pension funds should clearly communicate the risks implied by the pen-
sion contract and investment policies to participants. Social partners also
agreed that the increases in effective retirement ages should be accompan-
ied by measures to improve the employability of workers and improve the
functioning of the labor market for older workers.
Three types of pension rights
The existing Dutch pension contract can be characterized as having indi-
vidual guaranteed pension rights as well as collective buffers.12 The reform
proposals advocate the introduction of individual soft rights that explicitly
depend on the uncertain development of trends in life expectancy and
returns on financial markets. The remainder of the section briefly consid-
ers the strength and weaknesses of the three types of pension rights:
individual guarantees, collective buffers, and individual soft rights.
Individual guarantees
Individual guarantees (hard rights) are important first and foremost
because many individuals prefer guarantees and indicate they are willing
to pay for them in terms of additional contributions to compensate for
reduced investment returns (van Rooij et al., 2007). Guarantees are easy to
communicate. Moreover, they are attractive from a regulatory perspective
because solvency supervision is well established (e.g. Solvency II). Last but
not least, the Dutch system is rooted in what is perceived as guaranteed
nominal income contracts. Hence, it seems attractive to offer these guar-
antees as an option when the existing pension contract is converted into
a new pension contract.
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Guarantees also feature considerable disadvantages. Guarantees make a
given pension ambition (in terms of an expected pension outcome) more
expensive because the benefits of risk premia in financial markets are
foregone. Furthermore, guarantees often imply a focus on nominal pen-
sion income, rather than on the purchasing power of pensions. In many
countries, indexed-linked bond markets are not as well developed as the
market for nominal bonds. This is definitely the case for the Netherlands.
Bonds linked to Dutch price or wage inflation are not traded apart from
small trades in the OTCmarket. The use of bonds linked to European price
inflation yields substantial basis risks and even that market is small relative
to the accumulated Dutch pension assets. The use of nominal guarantees
implies substantial inflation risks.
Guarantees also discipline the investment strategy. This can be seen as
either an advantage or a disadvantage. Subjective judgments by trustees are
less important if guarantees are provided. If pension funds had defended
their nominal guarantees during the crisis, they would have reduced invest-
ment risks, at the cost of their investment exposure when markets recov-
ered. Finally, it should be noted that the ultimate guarantee cannot be
offered. Even European sovereign bonds have shown to be potentially
risky, and the crisis showed that even insurers can go bankrupt. Whereas
the financial crisis has stimulated the demand for guarantees, providing
guarantees that cannot be honored in extreme scenarios like the crisis can
be quite misleading.
Collective buffers
Collective buffers can smooth fluctuations in financial markets. This can be
attractive if agents take too little investment risk because myopic risk
aversion implies that they react too much to short-term volatility (Bernatzi
and Thaler, 1995). A second argument in favor of collective buffers is that
they allow risk-sharing with future generations. The validity of this argu-
ment is limited by the requirement that the buffer inherited by new
entrants should be large enough to make participation in the fund suffi-
ciently attractive, as otherwise the mandatory participation will be
challenged. Adequate supervision is therefore required to prevent funds
from shifting too many risks onto future generations. Another drawback of
collective buffers is that they reduce the scope for individual decision-
making that tailors investment risk to individual preferences. Moreover,
they cloud information on who actually bears risks. Last but not least,
collective buffers may give rise to political risks as it is unclear which
stakeholders will benefit from these buffers. Indeed, the trustees have
substantial discretion in allocating these buffers across participants.
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Individual soft rights
As stated before, the reform proposals advocate the introduction of indi-
vidual soft rights. Individual soft rights deliver pension income until retire-
ment that depends in an ex ante defined way on the developments in
financial markets, for example, by linking to stock market indices or
interest rates. Individual soft rights can be transferred at market value,
for example, when moving to another job, and cannot be affected by
discretionary decisions of the trustees. These individual soft rights serve
multiple goals:
 They create risk absorbers for the pension fund and enable it to take
substantial investment risk on behalf of the participants.
 They identify individual ownership of components in the collective
buffer. This reduces discretion of the governing board to redistribute
resources, thereby reducing political risk and providing transparency
ex ante on the true risk exposure of participants.13
 Clear individual ownership allows capital to be transferred to other
pension providers (e.g. when participants move to another job).
 They allow more tailor-made risk taking on the basis of observable
individual characteristics, including age. Individual soft rights and
hard rights (i.e. guarantees) can be converted into each other when
changes in risk exposures are called for.
 They allow individuals to choose their own risk exposure.
 During the payout phase, pension funds can supplement income from
nominal guarantees by income from soft rights. In this way, retirees
can provide risk-taking capital without being forced to have an
upward-sloping consumption profile. This implies, however, that ret-
irees face the risk that their overall income declines in nominal terms
after an adverse shock.
The main challenge in introducing individual soft rights is communica-
tion. If hard rights are replaced by soft rights, pension income is no longer
guaranteed, but rather it depends on uncertain future developments in
financial markets and in life expectancy. Communicating this uncertainty
to laymen is far from trivial. Another problem is that probability statements
about possible future income levels depend on various subjective elements,
such as the equity premium or the correlation between risk factors. Soft
rights are not new in the Dutch pension contract because they are also
implicit in existing collective buffers, which provide the funds for increas-
ing the nominal guarantees through indexation. Possible ways to commu-
nicate the uncertainty about the purchasing power of the future pension
income have already been widely discussed. Clearly, however, the reform
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process will make the soft rights more dominant so that adequate commu-
nication about uncertainty will become more important.
Another challenge for the implementation of pension contracts with
individual soft rights is designing adequate risk-sharing between stake-
holders and selecting a proper investment strategy for the fund, which
determines the risk features of the soft rights. One of the strengths of
typical Dutch pension contracts is that risk factors that cannot be traded
on financial markets (e.g. longevity risks, inflation risks) can be traded
within the pension fund (see ‘Strengths of Dutch occupation plans’ sec-
tion). To illustrate, retirees can be protected against wage inflation if the
soft rights of young workers are used to buffer these risks. The fair com-
pensation for these young workers, however, is hard to determine objec-
tively as wage risks are not traded on financial markets, so that no market
prices are available. In a similar fashion, longevity risks at older ages could
be insured by soft rights—albeit objective market prices are absent due to
the lack of trade in systematic longevity risk.
The investment policies of collective pension funds can be viewed
as follows. First, one considers the hedging portfolios for the various
participants. The nature of these hedging portfolios differs between
the nominal guarantees (i.e. the hard rights) and the individual soft
rights. In case of the hard rights, these hedging portfolios contain nomi-
nal bonds (with low credit risks) with durations matching the (deferred)
nominal annuity payments to participants. This portfolio is a buy-and-
hold portfolio.
As regards individual soft rights, the hedging portfolio matches as
close as possible the average real ambitions of the participants of the
pension funds; that is, price-indexed or wage-indexed benefits.14 In
addition, soft rights involve a speculative portfolio that aims at maximiz-
ing the return on the mismatch risk with the hedging portfolio. This
mismatch risk may involve investment risk and interest-rate risks. The
weights of the hedging and speculative portfolios can be determined in
a dynamic fashion; these two portfolios, thus, typically are not buy-and-
hold portfolios. In a complete contract, how these weights depend on
state variables is determined ex ante. Also, the way the realized mis-
match risk (which may also include mismatch risks on the hard rights if
these rights cannot be completely matched) is distributed over the
various participants is determined ex ante in a complete contract.15
The risk premia on these mismatch risks can be distributed to the partici-
pants who bear these risks, but a collective fund may distribute these
premia also in another way.
In principle, individuals can be offered a choice between hard rights and
soft rights. The prices at which these rights can be exchanged can be based
on market prices, but they do not have to be.
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Contract examples
In the previous section, we outlined the types of pension rights that could be
included in new Dutch pension contracts (individual hard rights, individual
soft rights, and collective buffers) and analyzed advantages and disadvantages
of the three kinds of pension rights. Next, we discuss a number of specific
contracts and how they combine these pension rights. We explore also
how the contracts contribute to having more soft rights, in response to the
experience of the pension crisis and the recommendations of the govern-
ment committees on pension policy reform to increase the amount of risk-
bearing capital of pension funds. Moreover, we compare the potential new
contracts with the existing Dutch pension contract (see ‘Dutch occupational
pensions’ section). The comparison with individual DC contracts as they are
offered in many countries worldwide is taken up in the following sections.
Defined Ambition
Boeijen et al. (2010) have suggested a pension contract that contains
individual soft rights as well as a collective buffer. The contract is referred
to as ‘Defined Ambition’ to distinguish it from conventional DB or DC
plans. In the Defined Ambition model, the active participants annually
accrue lifelong pension income as of a particular date of retirement. The
real funding rate of the pension fund, defined as the market value of the
assets over the market value of risk-free fully indexed pension benefits,
determines possible adjustments of accrued (soft) rights to the fluctuating
value of market assets and real interest rates affecting the value of risk-free
indexed liabilities of the fund. If the real funding rate exceeds a certain
upper limit, existing nominal pension rights (in terms of a deferred annu-
ity) will be gradually increased by more than the rate of inflation; if the real
funding rate is less than a lower limit, nominal pension income will
increase by less than the rate of inflation and may even decline in nominal
terms. The asset mix does not depend on the funding rate.
This contract differs in at least three important aspects from the existing
contract. First of all the contract is complete and explicitly chooses not to
defend nominal guarantees; that is, not to reduce risk levels to avoid
benefit cuts if the nominal funding rate falls to 100 percent. Cutting
benefits is no longer a solution as a last resort but a standard risk-sharing
mechanism. Accordingly, individual soft rights replace individual hard
rights. Secondly, benefit cuts and bonuses depend on the investment
returns and are not constrained by the level of inflation. Finally, the
funding rate determines whether real pension incomes are increased or
decreased, and it is defined in real terms and thus accounts for the effect
of future inflation on the liabilities of the pension fund to younger
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generations. In this way, premature payouts to the retirees are avoided if
rising nominal interest rates on account of increasing inflation expecta-
tions inflate the nominal funded rate.
The contract is similar to the current contract in that collective buffers
are used to share risks with future generations. In particular, pension rights
that are accumulated after financial shocks hit are affected as these shocks
continue to affect the funding rate during the period afterwards, depend-
ing on how rapidly the real funding rate is brought back to its equilibrium
value of 100 percent. Contracts that contain collective buffers (which may
be negative) that are not directly assigned to particular individual partici-
pants are called open systems (Bovenberg and van Ewijk, 2011a). In closed
systems, collective buffers are absent and the property rights of the assets of
the fund are allocated to current participants so that the funding rate is
always 100 percent.
A return-smoothing model, for now, seems to be preferred by the Dutch
social partners. This avoids individual hard rights and consists only of
individual soft rights and collective buffers; hence, it is closely related to
Defined Ambition with two important differences. First, the liabilities in
the real funding rate are computed on the basis of not the risk-free real rate
but a discount rate that includes a risk premium based on the expected
returns on the actual investment portfolio of the fund. A second difference
is the way that real pension incomes are adjusted if the real funding rate
differs from 100 percent. In that case, a tenth of the funding gap is
distributed uniformly over all participants.16
Age differentiation in indexation
Many of the contracts that have been proposed contain elements of life
cycle investing. On the one hand, taking investment risks is obviously
important to keep the pension system attractive for young participants.
On the other hand, retirees typically prefer to take only limited investment
risks. One possible way to reconcile the conflicting wishes of younger and
older participants is to use age-dependent indexation, which increases or
decreases the (accrued) pension income using a larger percentage for the
young than for the elderly (see Molenaar and Ponds, 2011). As in the
Defined Ambition model, the real funding rate is computed with real
interest rates as discount rates, and it determines whether rights are
increased or decreased. Collective buffers are used to share risks with
future generations. A similar mechanism could be used to limit the risks
for other groups of participants than the elderly, for example, low-income
workers. Groups who face more uncertain indexation benefit from a
higher expected level of indexation.17
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Growth rate approach
Another possibility to protect retirees against sizeable fluctuations in their
annual income is to design the pension contract in such a way that during
the decumulation phase, the payout is adjusted only gradually to wealth
shocks, just as in the current indexation mechanism with collective
buffers.
This approach can be implemented in both closed and open systems. In
the closed collective growth rate approach, the annual adjustment in the
growth rate18 (and the volatility in that growth rate) of the (projected)
pension income is the same for all participants. The required adjustment
after a shock is determined in such a way that the pension wealth that is
available in the fund is in expectation exactly sufficient to realize the
stochastic pension income (i.e. not only the median but in principle the
entire distribution) that is communicated, including annual adjustments
according to the expected growth rate. This approach implies that the
exposure to the mismatch risk is proportional to the duration of the
pension income and is thus cohort-specific. Whereas the adjustment of
the growth rate is similar across generations, the level of the growth rate
can differ depending on the shocks people have experienced during the
payout phase.
In the open collective growth rate approach, in contrast, future accruals
also share in the return shocks through fluctuations in a collective buffer.
In these open systems, not only the change but also the level of the growth
rate is uniform across cohorts. This uniform growth rate between cohorts
depends on the real funding rate. The growth rate approach is described in
more detail in Bovenberg and van Ewijk (2011b).
Combi-contract
A contract with more return-dependent pension income can also be
achieved starting from a contract with guarantees, but with lower nominal
guarantees than communicated currently.19 The nominal guarantees
should be matched with bonds of the same duration with low credit risk.
The remaining wealth can then be invested in equities or bonds with
higher credit risks. With low levels of guarantees, this remaining wealth
level will be sizable. In that case, it is attractive to allocate soft rights to
individuals in view of the advantages mentioned in ‘The impact of the
crisis’ section. Moreover, in the payout phase, part of the pension income
can be based on a variable annuity that can be reduced in case of adverse
financial shocks.
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Escalating annuity contract
The Danish ATP model combines individual hard rights with collective
buffers. Individual rights are nominal guarantees and pension income is
paid out only of these nominal guarantees so that pension income does not
decline in nominal terms. In contrast to the situation in the Netherlands,
nominal guarantees are completely hedged by nominal bonds so that these
nominal guarantees are defended on financial markets. In addition, ATP
has a collective buffer that is invested in equity and other risk-taking capital.
If this buffer exceeds 25 percent of the value of the nominal guarantees,
these guarantees are increased.
This model is in fact a collective variant of an escalating annuity (see e.g.
Bodie and Pesando, 1983). In an escalating annuity, pension income never
declines in nominal terms and investments in risky assets are used to raise
the guarantees. The amount of risky assets can be calibrated in such a way
that the nominal (deferred) annuity can be expected to be increased in
line with the inflation rate. For an individual, this implies that the share of
risky assets in the portfolio declines with age because the duration of the
pension income (and thus the capital required to raise guarantees in line
with inflation) falls with age. In a collective scheme, the required share of
risky assets depends on the age composition of the fund.
One can also combine a combi-contract during the accumulation phase
with an escalating annuity during the payout phase. Accordingly, the
overall expected deferred annuity may decline in nominal terms during
the accumulation phase, but the annuity can never decline in nominal
terms during the payout phase. This implies that people can benefit from
the risk premium during the accumulation phase and benefit from a
nominal guarantee when retired.
Conclusion
Themain aim of the many alternatives to the existing Dutch contract is that
the contract is adjusted in line with the directions chosen in the reform
process by the social partners in June 2010. The new contracts should
stabilize contribution rates by creating mechanisms such that investment
risk can be taken and allocated explicitly to groups of participants. Individ-
ual soft rights and limits on the buffer fluctuations will increase transpar-
ency and will prevent the shifting of funding deficits onto future
generations.
The new Dutch pension contract will be a hybrid model between the DB
and DC approaches. The DC component will be increased in the sense that
the pension income is no longer guaranteed, but depends on returns in
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/8/2012, SPi
The Case of the Netherlands 257
financial markets and longevity. Nevertheless, like the existing contract,
the new Dutch pension contract will continue to differ in a number of
important aspects from the typical DC contract implemented in many
countries worldwide. In particular, the set of choice-options will be rather
limited in order to protect individuals from behavioral biases. This feature
contributes also to rather low-cost load. This design feature is similar to the
increasing emphasis on optimal choice architectures in DC schemes. In the
Dutch model, however, trustees of the fund take more far-reaching invest-
ment decisions than managers of the mutual funds in which DC partici-
pants choose to invest. This is related to the emphasis in the Dutch model
on providing annuities, which is in fact the most dominant difference
between the new Dutch model and the DC world as known today. This
emphasis on annuity income is rooted in the Dutch Defined Benefit
tradition. A vast academic literature analyzes the advantages and disadvan-
tages of pension income (annuities) over pension wealth (lump sum).
Extensive references can be found in Mitchell and Piggott (2011). The
specific case of the Netherlands, where annuities are also mandatory in case
of most DC contracts, was recently analyzed by Brown and Nijman (2011).
The emphasis on annuity income rather than wealth accumulation per
se implies challenges to investment strategies that are not transparent in
most current DC contracts. In particular, both interest-rate risk and infla-
tion risks will be managed in the contracts outlined in the ‘Three types of
pension rights’ section to avoid undesired fluctuations in pension income
or projected pension income. As argued in ‘The impact of the crisis’
section, if the pension wealth is to generate stable pension income eventu-
ally, the management of interest rate and inflation risks is actually equally
relevant in DC contracts. It is questionable, however, whether individuals
have the skills and access to financial instruments to do so. To obtain stable
real pension income, when approaching retirement, individuals should not
only reduce their equity exposure (as in target date funds) but also manage
interest and inflation risks; that is, replicate or buy indexed and variable
deferred annuities. The new Dutch contracts impose such investment
strategies on their participants.
Endnotes
1. In terms of active participants, the most important other type of pension fund is
a company pension fund. A company, however, does not have to set up its own
company pension fund, but can contract out the pension scheme to an insur-
ance company.
2. The nominal funding rate of a pension fund is defined as financial wealth
relative to nominal pension liabilities. The latter are defined as the sum of the
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nominal pension rights that the participants of the scheme have already
accumulated. The real funding rate is defined in a similar way, but defines
liabilities in real terms assuming full future wage or price indexation to the
pension rights that participants have accumulated.
3. In calculating the real funding rate, we assumed a duration of pension liabil-
ities of fifteen years, a nominal interest rate of 4.5 percent, price inflation of
2 percent, wage inflation of 3 percent, and weights attached to wage and price
inflation of 65 and 35 percent, respectively.
4. As pension funds with lower funding ratios tend to be relatively small, they
represent only about 7 percent of the participants of pension funds.
5. For a more elaborate discussion on the development of the funding rates
during the financial crisis, see Bonenkamp et al. (2010).
6. Smaller pension funds typically reduced their exposure to nominal risks more
than the larger funds. Among other things, this may be due to the fact that
larger pension funds would have had to trade in rather illiquid markets during
the financial crisis.
7. Also, the rules for transferring pension rights across pension funds show that
the individual ownership of the collective buffer is not well defined. In particu-
lar, participants can take only the value of their nominal pension rights with
them if they move to another pension fund on account of a change in jobs.
8. Indeed, nontransparent redistribution may be a drawback of pension systems
like the Dutch one that focus on individual annuities, rather than individual
wealth positions. By changing the rules for the annuities, pension funds may
redistribute wealth positions across stakeholders. In traditional DC plans, in
contrast, individual wealth positions are protected better. The plans, however,
tend to inadequately manage the risks of providing income streams in
retirement.
9. Not only communications to participants but also recovery plans pay inade-
quate attention to risk. In particular, recovery plans are based on the expected
path and do not look at the risk that recovery does not happen on account of
financial risk.
10. This assumes that all agents feature the same constant relative risk aversion and
that utility is time separable and separable in consumption of commodities and
leisure. More generally, optimal risk-sharing implies that everybody’s marginal
utility changes with the same percentage after a shock hits. See Bohn (2005).
11. The Frijns et al. (2010) report also contains important recommendations to
strengthen the role of trustees of a fund versus asset managers. We do not
consider these governance issues here.
12. The supervisory rules, however, do not force pension funds to match their
nominal obligations if capital buffers become very low. One can therefore
argue that the current contract does not provide guarantees and is character-
ized by return-dependent benefits already. The ambiguity of the current pen-
sion contract is one of the main weaknesses of the Dutch pension system.
13. One can thus argue that individual soft rights make the ownership of soft rights
‘harder’. Indeed, an alternative definition of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ rights is that, in
contrast to ‘hard’ rights, ‘soft’ rights leave discretion in the hands of the
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governing board on how to distribute resources. With this alternative definition
of soft rights, the newly introduced rights should be called ‘hard’.
14. Most pension funds aim at wage-indexed pensions for workers and at price-
indexed pensions for retirees. Some pension funds (particularly in the public
sector and the health-care sector) aim at wage indexation also for retirees.
15. In principle, one can distribute various mismatch risks in different ways over
the participants. Here, we assume, however, that all mismatch risks are
distributed in the same way over the participants.
16. While many argue in favor of life cycle investing, the legal requirement to avoid
age discrimination for now seems to impose that relative cuts and bonuses are
to be identical for all active participants. It is still unclear whether an option to
choose nominal guarantees rather than a risky investment portfolio will be
offered to retirees.
17. The return-smoothing model also implies different exposures to risk of retir-
ees and workers. In particular, retirees bear less investment risk, as their
purchasing power is affected only gradually by shocks. Workers, in contrast,
tend to bear the full brunt of the shocks, as they tend to retire after the
smoothing period has ended. A major difference with the explicit age differen-
tiation in indexation is that those who bear more risk are not rewarded for the
additional risk they bear.
18. The growth rate is measured compared to the targeted indexation variable. To
illustrate, if the pension contract aims to deliver wage-indexed benefits, the
growth rate is measured compared to the growth rate of wages.
19. As argued in ‘The impact of the crisis’ section, real guarantees cannot be
hedged in financial markets because of the lack of an indexed-linked bond
market in the Netherlands. Small funds can insure inflation through the OTC
market.
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